SAMED 1984 Consensus Statement - Supplemental Thoughts

Home	Syracuse Area Middle East Dialogue Group Supplemental Statement November, 1984

The "Consensus Statement" of the Syracuse Middle East Dialogue Group is a result of many hours of discussion and debate among a diverse group of people. The individuals broght to the Dialogue widely disparate perceptions of historical facts and of current events as they relate to the Middle East. As individuals, we still retain different perspectives and priorities; through the process of dialogue, however, we have been able to define large areas of common ground. The Consensus Statement reflects a number of shared assumptions and conclusions about the problems of the Middle East. The statement, and the process of dialogue which preceded it, were also influenced by assumptions reflected in the tripartite structure of the group itself. The following is an attempt to make these assumptions explicit. The existence of the State of Israel is a reality that cannot be altered without widespread conflict and bloodshed. Unless the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization acknowledge this fact, there can be no peace in the Middle East. The existence of the Palestinian people is a reality that cannot be altered without widespread conflict and bloodshed. Unless the State of Israel acknowledges this fact, there can be no peace in the Middle East. The Israelis and the Palestinians each think of themselves as nations. Those self conceptions are now unalterable. In our time, a people that defines itself as a nation often seeks political expression as an independent state. The Israeli nation has established a State. To overcome the antagonism between the two nations, the Palestinians should have the option to establish an independent Palestinian State, wihout impairing or threatening the independence of the State of Israel. Peaceful, negotiated settlements of the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and neighboring Arab states will require a compromise on all sides, but peace is preferable to the continuation of the state of war. There is no plausible scenario for a military "scenario" to the conflicts in the Middle East. Resumption of "active" war will only bring death and destruction to the people of the region; it may escalate into confrontation between the superpowers and expansion of the conflict. Continuation of the "passive" war, with intermittent military and terrorist operations on both sides, may result in less widespread devastation, but it will require Israel and its Arab neighbors to maintain their present states of seige; it will continue to strain their economies to the point where their respective social orders are threatened; and it will not allow the parties to address the legitimate claims of the Palestinians for self-determination. Failure to progress towards an honorable end to the state of war will accelerate the present trend toward polarization and extremism on all sides. Violence against innocent civilians, in addition to its manifest injustice, increases the mutual fear and hatred of the two sides. In consequence, it diminishes the chances for reconciliation and peace. The time has come to interrupt the escalating cycle of fear, hatred, and moral condemnation of each side by the other. Nothng has contributed more to this cycle than violent attacks by partisans of each side on the noncombatants and civilians of the other side. To heighten the opportunity for reconciliation and peace, all such attacks should now cease. A freeze on Israeli settlement in the West Bank would be a significant gesture of good faith by Israel at relatively little risk. It would halt a process that previous U.S. administrations, as well as world opinion, have seen as illegal. By altering ownership and residence in the occupied land, Israeli settlement activity exacerbates tensions and changes the status of the territory in dispute. A freeze would halt that process and help to create an atmospher more conducive to successful negotiations. Recognition by the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization of each other, though difficult for each side, would greatly enchance the prospects of a negotiated settlement of their conflicting claims. Unless such recognition is simultaneous and explicit, it is unlikely to occur. It would be difficult for each side to recognize the other. Recognition and good-faith negotiations, especially if successful, imply major concessions by each side. For many Palestinians, recognizing the State of Israel would mean agreeing to the permanent retention by a Jewish State of land which they believe rightly belongs to the Palestinian nation. They think of the State of Israel as an illegitimate intruder into their land. They regard the State of Israel as the cause of second-class citizenship for many Palestinians living within Israel and of homelessness and despair for many Palestinians living outside of Israel. They do not recognize the claims of Israel to the land inside the pre-1967 border, the Green Line, much less the claim of many Israelis to the occupied territories. For them, the preferred solution would be a secular, bi-national Palestinian State covering the territory from Jordan to the Mediterranean. For many Israelis, recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the option of a West Bank, Gaza-Strip Palestinian State would mean strengthening their enemies. They believe completely in the legitimacy of the claim to a Jewish state in some, if not all, of the land between Jordan and the Mediterranean. The also believe that the occupied territories, or major portions of them, provide necessary protection and an additional buffer against armed attacks by hostile Arab nations. They consider that a two-state solution would mean the Palestinians and their Arab allies would have acquired a territorial base that could be used for military attacks against the State of Israel. Furthermore, they believe that even if the Palestinians were satisfied with a two-state solution, the other Arab nations would not permanently tolerate the existence of Israel. Concessions are required, therefore, on both sides. The Palestinians, though preferring a secular bi-national state in the entire territory, wouold have to accept a fraction of that territory. The Israelis, preferring Israeli control of all or most of the entire territory, would have to negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization and accept the prospect of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza-Strip. The question is whether the gains that might be attained would compensate for the concessions each side is asked to provide. If everything wree to work out as proposed, major gains could be achieved by each side: statehood for the Palestinians, increased security for the Israelis, and for both, an important step towards a durable peace. The Palestinians would obtain the opportunity to implement their national aspirations through establishing an independent Palestinian State, or other structure of their choice. The Israelis would obtain recognition of the legitimacy of the State of Israel by the surrounding Arab states. Security is often said to be the major problem for the Israelis. Through successful negotiations, the would thereby avail themselves of the course of action described in a recent detailed study* as the one strategic course most likely to increase their security in the long run. Both sides would benefit by the prospect of a durable peace, based on agreement by each side to accept the legitimacy of the other. We are convinced that bilateral negotiations for peace can only be achieved by mutual and simultaneous recognition. Neither side is likely to recognize the other, unless it is certain that it will be recognized in return. A unilateral step would be seen by either as offering too much of a concession for too unlikely a gain. Neither side could mobilize the needed support in its own camp unless the incentive of a major gain was possible. If recognition could be mutual and simultaneous, however, each side might be able to concede something important in return for a chance at something even more important: secure and independent statehood. * The study, done by Mark A. Heller of the Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, is called A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1983. Heller concludes that the creation of a West Bank Palestinian State -- after negotiation and wtih the appropriate guarantees and territorian adjustments -- offers a greater chance for Israeli security than any of the other alternatives which have been put forth (e.g., continuation of the status quo, including military occupation; unilateral withdrawl; unilateral Israeli annexation; the "Jordanian solution").

Syracuse Area Middle East Dialogue Group

Supplemental Statement

November, 1984

The "Consensus Statement" of the Syracuse Middle East Dialogue Group is a result of many hours of discussion and debate among a diverse group of people. The individuals broght to the Dialogue widely disparate perceptions of historical facts and of current events as they relate to the Middle East. As individuals, we still retain different perspectives and priorities; through the process of dialogue, however, we have been able to define large areas of common ground.

The Consensus Statement reflects a number of shared assumptions and conclusions about the problems of the Middle East. The statement, and the process of dialogue which preceded it, were also influenced by assumptions reflected in the tripartite structure of the group itself. The following is an attempt to make these assumptions explicit.

The existence of the State of Israel is a reality that cannot be altered without widespread conflict and bloodshed. Unless the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization acknowledge this fact, there can be no peace in the Middle East.

The existence of the Palestinian people is a reality that cannot be altered without widespread conflict and bloodshed. Unless the State of Israel acknowledges this fact, there can be no peace in the Middle East.

The Israelis and the Palestinians each think of themselves as nations. Those self conceptions are now unalterable. In our time, a people that defines itself as a nation often seeks political expression as an independent state. The Israeli nation has established a State. To overcome the antagonism between the two nations, the Palestinians should have the option to establish an independent Palestinian State, wihout impairing or threatening the independence of the State of Israel.
Peaceful, negotiated settlements of the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and neighboring Arab states will require a compromise on all sides, but peace is preferable to the continuation of the state of war.

There is no plausible scenario for a military "scenario" to the conflicts in the Middle East. Resumption of "active" war will only bring death and destruction to the people of the region; it may escalate into confrontation between the superpowers and expansion of the conflict. Continuation of the "passive" war, with intermittent military and terrorist operations on both sides, may result in less widespread devastation, but it will require Israel and its Arab neighbors to maintain their present states of seige; it will continue to strain their economies to the point where their respective social orders are threatened; and it will not allow the parties to address the legitimate claims of the Palestinians for self-determination. Failure to progress towards an honorable end to the state of war will accelerate the present trend toward polarization and extremism on all sides.
Violence against innocent civilians, in addition to its manifest injustice, increases the mutual fear and hatred of the two sides. In consequence, it diminishes the chances for reconciliation and peace.

The time has come to interrupt the escalating cycle of fear, hatred, and moral condemnation of each side by the other. Nothng has contributed more to this cycle than violent attacks by partisans of each side on the noncombatants and civilians of the other side. To heighten the opportunity for reconciliation and peace, all such attacks should now cease.
A freeze on Israeli settlement in the West Bank would be a significant gesture of good faith by Israel at relatively little risk.

It would halt a process that previous U.S. administrations, as well as world opinion, have seen as illegal. By altering ownership and residence in the occupied land, Israeli settlement activity exacerbates tensions and changes the status of the territory in dispute. A freeze would halt that process and help to create an atmospher more conducive to successful negotiations.
Recognition by the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization of each other, though difficult for each side, would greatly enchance the prospects of a negotiated settlement of their conflicting claims. Unless such recognition is simultaneous and explicit, it is unlikely to occur.

It would be difficult for each side to recognize the other. Recognition and good-faith negotiations, especially if successful, imply major concessions by each side.

For many Palestinians, recognizing the State of Israel would mean agreeing to the permanent retention by a Jewish State of land which they believe rightly belongs to the Palestinian nation. They think of the State of Israel as an illegitimate intruder into their land. They regard the State of Israel as the cause of second-class citizenship for many Palestinians living within Israel and of homelessness and despair for many Palestinians living outside of Israel. They do not recognize the claims of Israel to the land inside the pre-1967 border, the Green Line, much less the claim of many Israelis to the occupied territories. For them, the preferred solution would be a secular, bi-national Palestinian State covering the territory from Jordan to the Mediterranean.

For many Israelis, recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the option of a West Bank, Gaza-Strip Palestinian State would mean strengthening their enemies. They believe completely in the legitimacy of the claim to a Jewish state in some, if not all, of the land between Jordan and the Mediterranean. The also believe that the occupied territories, or major portions of them, provide necessary protection and an additional buffer against armed attacks by hostile Arab nations. They consider that a two-state solution would mean the Palestinians and their Arab allies would have acquired a territorial base that could be used for military attacks against the State of Israel. Furthermore, they believe that even if the Palestinians were satisfied with a two-state solution, the other Arab nations would not permanently tolerate the existence of Israel.

Concessions are required, therefore, on both sides. The Palestinians, though preferring a secular bi-national state in the entire territory, wouold have to accept a fraction of that territory. The Israelis, preferring Israeli control of all or most of the entire territory, would have to negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization and accept the prospect of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza-Strip.

The question is whether the gains that might be attained would compensate for the concessions each side is asked to provide. If everything wree to work out as proposed, major gains could be achieved by each side: statehood for the Palestinians, increased security for the Israelis, and for both, an important step towards a durable peace. The Palestinians would obtain the opportunity to implement their national aspirations through establishing an independent Palestinian State, or other structure of their choice. The Israelis would obtain recognition of the legitimacy of the State of Israel by the surrounding Arab states. Security is often said to be the major problem for the Israelis. Through successful negotiations, the would thereby avail themselves of the course of action described in a recent detailed study* as the one strategic course most likely to increase their security in the long run. Both sides would benefit by the prospect of a durable peace, based on agreement by each side to accept the legitimacy of the other.

We are convinced that bilateral negotiations for peace can only be achieved by mutual and simultaneous recognition. Neither side is likely to recognize the other, unless it is certain that it will be recognized in return. A unilateral step would be seen by either as offering too much of a concession for too unlikely a gain. Neither side could mobilize the needed support in its own camp unless the incentive of a major gain was possible. If recognition could be mutual and simultaneous, however, each side might be able to concede something important in return for a chance at something even more important: secure and independent statehood.

* The study, done by Mark A. Heller of the Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, is called A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel, Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1983. Heller concludes that the creation of a West Bank Palestinian State -- after negotiation and wtih the appropriate guarantees and territorian adjustments -- offers a greater chance for Israeli security than any of the other alternatives which have been put forth (e.g., continuation of the status quo, including military occupation; unilateral withdrawl; unilateral Israeli annexation; the "Jordanian solution").